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Abstract 
Using panel household survey data from rural Ethiopia, we investigate informal risk sharing 
against health shocks in the presence of multiple risk sharing networks. We find that neither 
short-term nor long-term health shocks are insured through transfers from networks such as 
friends, neighbors, and members of informal associations. However, networks related along 
bloodline such as extended family members provide assistance when health shocks are long-term 
such as disabilities. The results show that these networks strategically complement planned 
component of their transfers which are made on a regular basis such as remittance, entitlement, 
or chop money. Moreover, we find significant history dependence in transfers from not only 
genetically distant networks but also extended family members as well as formal institutions, 
which seems to discourage dependency. Finally, the findings suggest significant heterogeneity in 
transfers.  
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1. Introduction 
Risks and shocks are fundamental to the creation and reproduction of poverty. Not only they 
reduce current consumption levels but also welfare by reducing the ability of households to cope 
with subsequent shocks (Fafchamps, 1999). Health shocks are the most important idiosyncratic 
risks that people in rural areas face. In the absence of formal insurance markets and public 
insurance systems, poor households in low-income countries are forced to devise their coping 
strategies. One such strategy is participation in informal risk sharing arrangements which are 
voluntary contracts in which individuals provide assistance to others in exchange for a credible 
promise of future reciprocity.  
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which informal risk sharing arrangements 
through transfers responds to health shocks in the presence of multiple and overlapping risk 
sharing networks. Using panel household survey data from rural Ethiopia, we assess how 
transfers from different risk sharing networks with heterogeneous motives including formal 
institutions respond to health shocks. Moreover, we probe whether there is strategic interaction – 
complementarity or crowding-out – among networks and if so to what extent it determines the 
ability of households to cope with shocks.
Like many other low-income countries, people in rural villages in Ethiopia have limited 
access to formal health insurance products against health shocks. Insurance markets broadly and 
health insurance in particular are largely missing and tax-based public insurance systems and 
social protection programs are non-accessible to the majority of people in rural areas. Until early 
2000, formal health insurance was not available to the population in Ethiopia, and it is still 
underdeveloped. For instance, the percentage of people covered by health insurance in 2011/12 
is only 1.13% in rural areas and 2.47% in urban areas of Ethiopia (FMoH 2014). The health 
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insurance coverage across rural and urban areas of Ethiopia in 2007/08 was 0.32% (FMoH 
2014). Consequently, health shocks are largely absorbed by the individual herself and/or support 
from informal social networks such as relatives, friends, and neighbors. The extent to which 
these networks provide cushion against the different forms of idiosyncratic health shocks – short-
term or long-term – is not clear, especially in the presence of overlapping social networks. 
Gurmu and Tesfu (2011) provide details about health care system of Ethiopia. 
Our study contributes to the literature by empirically investigating how informal risk 
sharing through transfers from different networks responds to health shocks. We conduct our 
analysis separately for short-term and long-term health shocks. Categorizing health shocks into 
short- and long-term allows us to separately assess risk sharing against transitory illnesses and 
persistent shocks such as disabilities, which have higher welfare effects (Fafchamps and Kebede, 
2008).
The data are assembled from four rounds of panel data covering about 1,480 households 
in 15 rural villages in Ethiopia between 1994 and 1997. We consider transfers from different 
networks including family members, relatives, friends, neighbors, and members of informal 
savings, credit and funeral associations as well as formal religious, government and non-
government organizations. Based on genetic proximity to a household along bloodline, we 
classify all possible networks which made cash or in-kind transfers into four groups: i) non-
resident family, ii) relatives, iii) friends, neighbors, fellow members of informal savings and 
credit associations, and iv) formal institutions such as church, mosque, government, and non-
government organizations.  
In terms of methodology, we implement econometric methods which take into account 
the richness of the survey data and the non-normal distribution of transfers. The dependent 
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variable is transfer with large proportion of households receiving zero amounts which arises due 
to either  a corner solution where individuals decide to make zeros transfers or transfers are not 
in the choice set. We address such non-linear distribution in transfers using probit and Tobit 
specifications in a dynamic random effects model addressing initial conditions problem. 
Specifically, we implement Dynamic Correlated Random Effects Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (D-SUR) Probit and Tobit models. These models handle not only the aforementioned 
empirical issues but also the inherently dynamic risk sharing models in the presence of multiple 
and interdependent networks. Unlike single equation models, SUR model allows for transfers 
from one network to be correlated, providing important evidence on the extent and direction of 
interaction among networks.
What makes our model even more appealing is that it captures the interactions among 
networks not only on the time-varying idiosyncratic component but also on the time-invariant 
component of transfer. While the former can be interpreted as unplanned transfers made in 
response to unforeseen events or idiosyncratic shocks, the latter can be interpreted as planned 
transfers which are made on a regular basis such as remittances, entitlement, and chop money. 
Due to computational complexity involving D-SUR Probit and Tobit models as well as the lack 
of standard statistical software packages for these models, we use hierarchical Bayesian 
estimation method with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation and data augmentation 
techniques to estimate the models. 
To preview our results, we find that close family members and relatives, who are more 
likely to be altruistic along bloodline, make transfers in response to health shocks, particularly 
long-term health shocks. The same network makes more transfers to households headed by 
senior members of the village, suggesting altruism/social norms in that transfers are made 
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without anticipating future reciprocity. On the other hand, transfers from networks such as 
friends, neighbors, and fellow members of informal savings, credit, and funeral associations 
respond to neither short-term nor long-term health shocks. We also find significant history 
dependence in transfers from not only genetically distant networks but also extended family 
members as well as formal institutions.  Finally, the results suggest significant heterogeneity in 
both the probability and the amount of transfers.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 discusses the data and descriptive statistics. While Section 4 discusses the 
empirical strategy employed to estimate the model, Section 5 discusses results, and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Review of the Literature  
It is well established that, even in the absence of formal insurance institutions, Pareto optimum 
could be achieved through informal risk sharing contracts among self-interested risk-averse 
individuals (Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Kocherlakota, 1996; Fafchamps, 1999; Ligon et al., 
2002). In agreement with the theory, empirical evidence, mainly from developing countries, 
support the existence of at least partial risk sharing against idiosyncratic income and 
consumption shocks at various levels (Townsend, 1994; Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997; 
Morduch, 1991, 2002; Deaton; 1995; Udry, 1990 and 1994; Grimard, 1997). However, when it 
comes to shocks such as illness, evidence of risk sharing among self-interested villagers are 
rather bleak. There is little or no evidence of risk sharing against health shocks among self-
interested individuals. For instance, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) find that while income shocks 
are insured through risk sharing arrangements in rural Philippines, acute and non-acute health 
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shocks are not. Similarly, a study from rural Tanzania finds no evidence of risk sharing against 
health shocks at the network and village levels (DeWeerdt and Dercon, 2006).
The story, however, changes when motives other than self-interest such as emotions enter 
the picture. The most important emotion in the context of risk sharing is altruism. The roles of 
altruism and other motives in enforcing informal contracts are comprehensively reviewed in 
Fafchamps (2008). Altruism is understood as strong emotional reward for helping others and can 
potentially serve as enforcement instrument for informal arrangements. Altruism along 
bloodline, clan, and religious affiliations are by far the most important motives for risk sharing 
(Fafchamps, 2008; DeWeert and Fafchamps, 2011; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). For instance, 
Dercon and Krishnan (2002) find that except for poor households in the southern region of 
Ethiopia, there exists risk sharing against illness shocks within households where altruistic 
motive along bloodline is expected to be strong. Such risk sharing behavior among altruistically 
motivated individuals is observed because for sufficiently large motives the voluntary 
participation constraint becomes irrelevant and individuals provide assistance to their partners 
without the anticipation of future reciprocity (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Fafchamps, 2008).
Furthermore, motives arising from social norms and customs are well recognized in 
determining individuals’ sharing decisions (Fafchamps, 2008; Ligon and Schechter, 2012; Fehr 
and Falk 2002, Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Barr and Stein, 2008). These motives include fairness, 
inequality aversions, and redistributive social norms which could be intrinsic such as individuals’ 
“other-regarding preference” or extrinsic due to a system of rewards and punishments instituted 
by society. 
 Empirical evidence from laboratory and field experiments on the roles of social norms 
include Morsink (2014) using field experiment in Ethiopia, Barr and Stein (2008) using funeral 
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attendance in Zamabia, and Mirsut (2008) using data from inter-household transfers in Romania. 
For instance, Morsink (2014) find that more than 92% of non-altruistic farmers in rural Ethiopia 
make transfers based not only on self-interest but also on a combination of social preferences 
including inequality aversion and avoidance of punishment due to deviations from the sharing 
norm of the village.  
Risk sharing motives and a host of other factors including imperfect and asymmetric 
information give rise to heterogeneity in risk sharing behavior and determine the way networks 
are endogenously formed, the extent and efficiency of risk sharing, and the distribution of 
welfare (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006).
Given that risk sharing could take place at various levels – within a household, a network, 
a village, an ethnic group, and a region, which are often overlapping, strategic interactions 
among them could determine the extent to which risks are efficiently shared. The interactions 
among these networks could be complementary or crowding-out. Although there is a growing 
body of literature studying risk sharing in overlapping networks and endogenous network 
formation, such as Genicot and Ray (2003) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), little is 
understood about the implications of strategic interactions between these networks on welfare 
and risk sharing against idiosyncratic shocks such as illness and disability. Furthermore, most of 
the previous studies implicitly presume networks are exclusive ignoring possible strategic 
interactions and heterogeneity in risk sharing motives. This paper addresses these issues in the 
context of household survey panel data from rural Ethiopia. 
Our focus on health shocks and informal risk sharing networks is also of wider 
importance to formal risk sharing arrangements and the interaction between them. There is 
substantial interest on how formal insurance institutions such as index-based crop insurance and 
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community-based health insurance programs interact with informal risk sharing networks and 
vice-versa (Dubois et al., 2008). In countries such as India and Ethiopia, for instance, farmers are 
offered index-based crop insurance in villages where there already exists elaborate informal risk 
sharing networks.  There is evidence in the literature that the interaction between social networks 
groups is important. For instance, Boucher and Delpierre (2014) find that formal insurance such 
as index-based insurance schemes could crowd out informal risk sharing contracts if such 
insurance is provided to individuals. Similarly, Lin et al (2014) show that, in laboratory 
experiment, formal insurance significantly crowds out informal risk sharing contracts and the 
loss in welfare due to crowding-out is exacerbated in the presence of altruism and inequality. On 
the contrary, a study in Vietnam finds that informal risk sharing arrangements crowd out formal 
insurance markets (Wainwright and Newman, 2011). These findings highlight the importance of 
strategic interaction between formal and informal institutions. However, the implications of such 
strategic interactions among social networks in providing insurance against idiosyncratic health 
shocks is not well understood. This study fills the gap by modeling informal risk sharing against 
health shocks in the presence of multiple social networks.      
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The study uses longitudinal data from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS)1 which is 
one of the longest running household panel surveys in Africa. Started in 1989, the original 
survey includes seven villages. Since 1994, it was expanded to cover 15 peasant associations 
(PAs) in four regions with a sample size of approximately 1,480 households. In this paper, we 
use the first four rounds collected in the 1990s, i.e., the 1994a, 1994b, 1995, and 1997 rounds 
which provide a balanced panel with minimal attrition rate of around 6.7%. The dataset includes 
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detailed information on households’ demographic characteristics, consumption, health 
conditions, shocks, incomes, farming activities, informal networks, and transfers.
The dependent variable is logarithm of cash or in-kind transfers that households received 
in the past four months. In implementation, we use the logarithm of transfers plus 1 to avoid 
finding log of zeros.  In-kind transfers are converted to monetary values using local commodity 
prices collected in each survey year. The main explanatory variables measuring short-term and 
long-term health shocks are household head's number of physical disabilities and the number of 
days ill and unable to work in the past four months. In our empirical specifications discussed 
below, we include the difference between these two health measures and the corresponding 
village averages. A respondent is asked if he/she has 1) difficulty to stand up from a seated 
position, 2) difficulty to sweep a floor, 3) difficulty to walk independently for 5 km, 4) difficulty to 
carry 20 liters for 20 meters, and 5) difficulty to hoe a field in the morning. Our formal 
regression analysis controls for income and wealth using the size of total land, the value of 
livestock owned and the logarithm of non-food expenditure as proxies. Besides, we include 
education to control for investment in health, health behavior, and household's performance in 
the local labor market. Other set of control variables include demographic characteristics such as 
household size, marital status, and sex.  
Table 1 presents descriptive and summary statistics of the variables. Tables 2 and 3 
present detailed summary and description of transfers. The data show that average household 
head in rural villages is unable to work for eight days in a year due to illnesses. Conditional on 
being ill and unable to work, he/she losses about 36 work days in a year. The number of days ill 
is right censored at 30 days. Censored observations account for 12.65% of households who 
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reported to be ill and unable to work. Hence, averages are biased downwards. When it comes to 
disability, about 26% of household heads reported to have at least one physical disability. Out of 
the five indicators, the average number of disabilities a household head has is 0.7.
<< Table 1 about here >> 
As shown in Table 2, about 20% of households in rural Ethiopia received transfers from 
different sources. However, the bulk of transfers come from benevolent institutions such as 
churches, mosques, government, and non-governmental organizations supporting more than two-
third of the recipients or 13.8% of households in the survey. This highlights that for many 
households in rural Ethiopia, aid from formal institutions is an important means of coping with 
shocks. The remaining 40% of transfers come from informal sources such as non-resident family 
members, relatives, friends, neighbors, members of informal saving and credit (Iqqub) and 
funeral (Iddir) associations.
<< Table 2 about here >> 
The pooled data also show that about 22% of households received transfers from non-resident 
family members and relatives underscoring the importance of sharing along bloodline and 
kinship. As shown in Table 3, the conditional average transfer was about 478 Ethiopian Birr 
which was equivalent to 75.6 USD in 1994 exchange rate.  When transfers are disaggregated by 
group, the amount of transfer from network Group I (non-resident family members), Group II 
(relatives), Group III (friends, neighbors, members of Iqqub and Iddir), and Group IV (church, 
mosque, NGOs, government organizations) are 341 Birr, 324 Birr, 141 Birr, and 562 Birr, 
respectively.
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<< Table 3 about here >> 
4. Econometric Strategy
The empirical models are based on the theory of informal risk sharing strategies with limited 
commitment where individuals voluntarily participate in sharing arrangement in anticipation of 
future reciprocity. Such an arrangement results in Pareto-optimal allocation even among non-
altruistic self-interested individuals (see, for instance, Thomas and Worrall, 1988; Kocherlakota, 
1996). The introduction of altruism in the model, however, relaxes the participation constraint 
and assistances could be provided without the anticipation of future reciprocity given that such 
motive is strong (De Weerdt and Fafchamps 2011; Fafchamps, 2008). Details of the conceptual 
framework of informal risk sharing with limited commitment, which is the basis for our 
empirical model, are available in a Supplementary Appendix B on the author’s website.
4.1. Benchmark Model 
In the data, transfers are reported at a household level and information on the characteristics of 
the sender/s is limited. Using their response on the relationship of the sender for a particular 
transfer, we categorize transfers originating from four network groups denoted by j and estimate 
a recipient-level regression in a SUR framework allowing interaction among networks. Because 
risk sharing contracts with limited commitment are inherently dynamic due to history 
dependence, we include the lagged value of the dependent variable as a regressor. The dynamic 
model of transfer from group ݆to household ݅ can be written as
 ௝߬௜௧ ൌ ߛ ௝߬௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵܪ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚଶܣ݃݁௜ ൅ ࢼ௞࢞࢏࢚ ൅ ߙ௝௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ǡሺͳሻ
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where ௝߬௜௧is the level of transfer household ݅ receives in period ݐ, ܪ ௜ܵ௧ is the difference between 
health shock experienced by the household head and the village average, and ܣ݃݁௜ is the 
difference between age of the head for household ݅ and the village average capturing biological 
survival rate. Further, ࢞௜௧ is a vector of other control variables, ߝ௜௧ is the error term which is 
assumed i.i.d., ߛ and ࢼs are coefficients to be estimated, and ߙ௜ is household specific intercept 
capturing unobserved individual heterogeneity. In the presence of limited commitment, ߛ is 
expected to be negative. Following literature, we include some of the variables in deviations 
from village averages. One of the key variables is the difference between income of individual ݅
from ݆. Since village can be considered as partner ݆, these variables are included as deviations 
from the village averages. 
Estimating the dynamic unobserved effects model presented in Equation (1) poses a 
number of challenges including initial conditions problem, interdependence of transfers among 
different groups, and censoring in transfer amount due to corner solutions. In the frequentist 
framework, Fixed Effects (FE) is a common approach to deal with unobserved individual 
heterogeneity without imposing restricted distributional assumptions. However, when the model 
becomes dynamic, FE estimate is usually biased and inconsistent in short panel  like ours (e.g.,
Nickell, 1981).  The presence of heavy censoring in transfers also makes FE approach 
complicated. In such cases, dynamic correlated random effects (RE) model is appealing which 
also makes estimating non-linear models such as Probit and Tobit models easier. 
  In order to control for the correlation between the unobserved individual effects and the 
covariates, we follow Woodridge’s (2005) approach and include time-means of selected time-
varying independent variables and first round transfer amount in the model; see also Mundlak
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(1978) and Chamberlain (1980). Such an approach minimizes the initial conditions problem and 
provides consistent estimates when the unobserved individual heterogeneity and some of the 
time-varying covariates are correlated.  
Censoring due to corner solutions is another important issue in our case which arises due 
to substantial “pile-up” of transfers at zero. In the data, 80% of the pooled sample reported 
receiving zero transfer and when disaggregated by group, the percentage increases to more than 
90%. Left unaddressed, censoring could result in exaggerated slope estimates, commonly 
referred to as “expansion bias”, mainly on the lagged value (Rigobon and Stoker, 2007). Our 
dynamic model specification also address potential feedback effect from transfers to health 
shocks. One possible channel is past transfers affecting the chances of realizing health shocks in 
the current period though the direction is ambiguous. Since our dynamic specification directly 
controls for past transfers (lagged values), potential feedback effects/endogeneity are less of an 
issue.  
4.2. The Model with Strategic Interaction between Social Networks  
The proposed benchmark model, which parsimoniously addresses the empirical issues discussed 
above, is single-equation model that do not allow for strategic interaction of transfers from 
different social networks. We now present empirical model that addresses all empirical issues 
discussed above as well as strategic interaction among social networks in a DSUR setup. 
Although Li and Zheng (2008) propose dynamic Tobit model using Semiparametric Bayesian 
approach in a single equation problem, estimating DSUR Tobit model using standard statistical 
software packages is difficult due to lack of readily available econometric routines. Hence, we 
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estimate the DSUR model described below in a hierarchical Bayesian estimation framework 
(details are given in a supplementary appendix available from the authors).      
Let݉ denote sender group, where ݉ ൌ ͳ indicates transfers from non-resident family 
members (Group I), ݉ ൌ ʹ indicates transfers from a relative (Group II), ݉ ൌ ͵ indicates 
transfers from a friend, a neighbor, or members of Iqqub or Iddir (Group III), and ݉ ൌ Ͷ
indicates transfers from benevolent institutions such as church, mosque, government, or non-
government aid organizations (Group IV). Then, the hierarchical Bayesian correlated RE 
dynamic SUR Tobit model can be written as follows  
߬௠௜௧כ ൌ ߛ߬௠௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ࢄ௠௜௧ࢼ௠ ൅ ߙ௠௜ ൅ ߝ௠௜௧ǡሺʹሻ
߬௠௜௧ ൌ ݉ܽݔሺ߬݉݅ݐכ ǡ Ͳሻǡ
where ߬௠௜௧ is the logarithm of transfer from sender group ݉ ൌ ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡͶሽ, ߬௠௜௧כ  is the latent value of 
transfer, ࢄ௠௜௧ is a vector of covariates, ߙ௠௜ is the unobserved individual effect, and ߝ௠௜௧ is the 
idiosyncratic error term. In addition, following Wooldridge (2005) the random effects are 
assumed to be normally distributed conditional on a linear function of time-means of time-
varying covariates (ࢄ௠௜) and the initial period log transfer (߬௠௜଴) and can be written as follows:
ߙ௠௜ ൌ ߜ߬௠௜଴ ൅ ࢄ௠௜ܾ௠ ൅ ݑ௠௜ǡሺ͵ሻ
ࢿ௜௧ ൌ ሾߝଵ௜௧ǡ ߝଶ௜௧ǡ ߝଷ௜௧ǡ ߝସ௜௧ሿȁߙ௠௜ǡ ࢄ௠௜௧ǡ ߬௠௜ǡ௧ିଵ̱ܰሺ૙ǡࢹሻǡሺͶሻ
࢛௜ ൌ ሾݑଵ௜ǡ ݑଶ௜ǡ ݑଷ௜ǡ ݑସ௜ሿȁ߬௜଴ǡ ࢄ௜̱ܰሺ࢛ǡ ࢳሻǡሺͷሻ
where ࢄ௜ ൌ ሺࢄଵ௜ǡ ࢄଶ௜ǡ ࢄଷ௜ǡ ࢄସ௜ሻ. The interdependences among different sender groups are 
captured through correlations among the idiosyncratic error terms and correlations among the 
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unobserved individual heterogeneity terms, i.e. off-diagonal elements of ȳ andȭ, respectively, 
and are ൈ .
In order to estimate the random effects DSUR Tobit model given by equations (2)-(5), we 
use an efficient Bayesian estimation method with data augmentation technique (Albert and Chib 
1993). This approach treats the latent variables and the unobserved individual heterogeneity 
terms as additional parameters to be explicitly estimated using MCMC simulations techniques. 
The likelihood function, the joint posteriors of all parameters, the estimation algorithm, and the 
mathematical expressions for the average partial effects (APEs) for correlated RE DSUR Tobit 
model are given in a supplementary appendix. We also estimate RE DSUR Probit model as an 
alternative by dichotomizing receipt of transfers into binary indicators to model probability of 
positive transfers. However, given the similarity with the above modeling strategy adopted for 
Tobit framework, we do not present the likelihood function and the estimation algorithms of the 
model based on binary probit to save space.  
5. Results and Discussions 
In this section, we discuss the main findings on risk sharing against health shocks, history 
dependence (limited commitment), and interdependence of transfers among networks of different 
social distances, and heterogeneity. Tables 4 and 5 present the average partial effects (APEs) 
from static RE SUR Probit and Tobit models. While columns (i) and (ii) show the results when 
short-term and long-term health shocks enter the model separately, column (iii) presents the 
results when both short-term and long-term health shocks are included in the model. The results 
from the dynamic version of the models are given in tables 6 and 7, with the underlying 
coefficient estimates for the dynamic Tobit given in Table A.1 of Appendix A.  
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5.1 Health Shocks and Risk Sharing 
The results from the static and the DSUR models show that transfers from different sender 
groups are not responsive to short-term health shocks. This holds true regardless of social 
distances and model specifications. Although the APEs are positive in the dynamic Tobit model 
(Table 7, column (i)), it becomes statistically insignificant when we include long-term health 
shock in the model (column (iii)). Furthermore, not only the APEs are statistically insignificant 
but the magnitudes are also economically insignificant. This implies that regardless of social 
distances, households in rural Ethiopia do not receive assistance from others against the 
realization of short-term health shocks such as transitory illnesses.  
The results on long-term health shocks, measured in terms of the number of physical 
disabilities of the head, are rather sensitive to the econometric models. The APEs from the Tobit 
models are significant for transfers sent from Group I (non-resident family members). This 
implies that household heads with a number of physical disabilities receive more transfers from 
their non-resident family members. As shown in the tables, however, the APEs become 
insignificant when social distance along blood-line and kinship increases to Group II, Group III, 
and Group IV. This evidence suggests that informal risk sharing among “non-altruistic” 
individuals do not respond to health shocks and highlights that if long-term health shocks are 
insured through informal risk sharing networks, it is mainly due to risk sharing among extended 
family members. This result also corroborates with findings from other studies in the literature 
such as DeWeert and Fafchamps (2011), and Dercon and Krishnan (2000) which find that 
existence of informal risk sharing in times of illness mainly from individuals related along blood-
16
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line or kinship. However, the results should be interpreted with caution as they are sensitive to 
model selection.
The APEs on long-term health shocks from the probit models are all statistically 
insignificant highlighting that regardless of social distance, transfers are not responsive to long-
term health shocks.  
<< Table 4 about here >> 
<< Table 5 about here >> 
<< Table 6 about here >> 
<< Table 7 about here >> 
The findings further show that as the difference between the age of household head and the 
village average increases, households receive more transfers from their socially close relatives 
(groups I and II). This is consistent across all model specifications, except in the static Probit 
model for Group II.  However, age of household heads does not have significant impact on 
transfer decisions of sender Group III such as friends and neighbors who are not related along 
bloodline. The same holds true for Sender Group IV (benevolent institutions such as churches, 
mosques, and NGOs) in that age of the recipient does not have significant effect on the decision 
and amount of transfers. This remains true regardless of model specification. With regards to 
helping older members of society who are less likely to reciprocate in the future, the results 
highlight that altruistic and social norms are the most important motives. 
5.2 History Dependence/Limited Commitment 
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Theory suggests that limited commitment is a prominent feature of informal risk sharing 
arrangement among non-altruistic risk averse agents. The common empirical approach to test 
and account for limited commitment (history dependence) is to estimate dynamic models. In 
agreement with the theoretical prediction, we find negative history dependence among non-
altruistic risk sharing partners (Group III). The implication is that, all other factors held constant, 
households who received transfers in the current period from Group III are less likely to receive 
the same amount of transfer in the next period from the same group. For example, the results 
from the Probit model (see Table 6, Group III, column (iii)) imply that a household who received 
aid from sender Group III this period has a 2.6% lower chance of receiving transfer in the next 
period in an event that they face identical health shocks. Similarly, from the Tobit model (see 
Table 7, Group III, column (iii)), the estimated elasticity is -0.149 implying that if transfer 
received from a friend in the current period increases by 10%, the next period amount from the 
same network decreases by 1.5%. 
Interestingly, in both DSUR Probit and Tobit models, the APEs of the lagged dependent 
variable are negative and statistically significant even for sender Group II and Group IV. This 
suggests some evidence of history dependence among altruistically motivated partners such as 
relatives and formal and religious institutions. However, the evidence on limited commitment is 
inconclusive or absent for Group I who constitutes genetically close partners (non-resident 
family members) and are presumed to have stronger altruistic motives. Although the coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant in the probit model, it becomes positive and insignificant 
in the dynamic Tobit model which suggests that there is no conclusive evidence that the 
participation constraint binds for these socially close partners. This result is expected in the 
presence of strong altruism and social norms which makes the participation constraint or limited 
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commitment becomes irrelevant (Fafchamps, 2008). The magnitude of the coefficients also 
suggest that the extent of limited commitment tends to dissipate as the degree of altruism, 
measured by genetic proximity, increases (see results from the Tobit models in Table 7). Hence, 
one can deduce that in rural Ethiopia limited commitment is evident among non-altruistic risk 
sharing partners but it tends to weaken as ties among partners become stronger particularly along 
bloodline.
5.3 Strategic Interaction among Networks
The other important question that our study attempts to answer is how networks interact and, in 
particularly, how one group’s decision to make transfers depends on the decisions of another 
social network groups. The estimated correlations among the four transfer equations 
corresponding to the different social network groups provide a good measure on the direction 
and magnitude of interaction among these groups. The estimated correlations are presented in 
tables (8) and (9) for the static and dynamic versions of our models.  
If we ignore covariates for just the purpose of illustration, transfer from sender network ݆
to household ݅ can be written as the sum of the two components ௝߬௜௧ ൌ ߙ௝௜ ൅ ߝ௝௜௧. The first 
component (ߙ௝௜ሻdoes not change over time and could be interpreted as entitlement or transfer 
made to the household regardless of current circumstances. Alternatively, one can interpret this 
component as planned or pre-determined before the realization of shocks. The second component 
(ߝ௝௜௧) represents idiosyncratic part of transfer which changes over time such transfers made in 
response to shocks or emergencies. Our model captures the interaction between networks along 
these two separate components of transfers, i.e. ܿ݋ݎݎሺߙ௠௜ǡ ߙ௡௜௧ሻ andܿ݋ݎݎሺߝ௠௜௧ǡ ߝ௡௜௧ሻ. These 
correlation matrices not only unfold interesting interactions among social networks groups ݉
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and݊ but also their interaction on the specific components of transfer. While negative values 
imply crowding-out, positive values imply complementarity among networks.  
The results in Table (8) show that the magnitude of the correlations between the time-
invariant components of transfers,ܿ݋ݎݎሺߙ௠௜ǡ ߙ௡௜௧ሻ, are larger than the magnitude of correlations 
along the idiosyncratic componentsܿ݋ݎݎሺߝ௠௜௧ǡ ߝ௡௜௧ሻ.  However, the correlations on the 
idiosyncratic components are statistically insignificant in all models.
In the dynamic Tobit model (Table 9, column (iii)), the correlation between the time-
invariant component of transfers from Group I and Group II is 0.55 which is also statistically 
significant. This implies that these two networks, non-resident family members and relatives, 
which are closely related to the household along blood-line significantly complement the amount 
of planned component of transfers. The results also show some complementarity between Group 
I and Group III but the correlations are statistically insignificant.
<< Table 8 about here >> 
<< Table 9 about here >> 
With regard to interaction of networks on the idiosyncratic or time-varying component of 
transfers, the correlations are statistically and economically insignificant. This is true in all 
models and specifications. We can deduce that social networks do not appear to strategically 
coordinate idiosyncratic or unplanned component of transfers which are more likely to be made 
in response to shocks or unexpected circumstances.  
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Finally, we assess the heterogeneity in risk sharing in the presence of multiple and 
interacting networks. One way to assess the degree of heterogeneity is by inspecting the 
distribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity. One of the advantages of Bayesian method 
with MCMC simulation techniques is that we can directly estimate those parameters the same 
way we estimate other model parameters. In the absence of heterogeneity, the estimated 
coefficients collapse to a point mass (degenerate) with zero variances. However, the estimated 
variances of the unobserved heterogeneity are different from zero and statistically significant in 
all models (see tables 4-7). Figure (1) also shows that the distributions of the unobserved 
heterogeneity terms are non-degenerate. 
<< Figure 1 about here >> 
5.4. Further Discussions 
The results highlight that transfers from non-altruistic informal risk sharing networks such as 
friends, neighbors, and fellow members of informal savings, credit, and funeral associations 
respond to neither short-term nor long-term health shocks. However, there is some evidence that 
close family members and relatives, who are more likely to be altruistic along bloodline, make 
transfers in response to health shocks, particularly long-term health shocks. The same network 
makes more transfers to households headed by senior members of the village. The results suggest 
that altruism/social norms, without anticipating future reciprocity, play significant in providing 
assistance in times of illness, disabilities, and old age.  
In the absence of formal health insurance and financing systems, therefore, households in 
rural Ethiopia are susceptible to the consequence of health shocks. In light of our findings that 
households do not receive assistances either from non-altruistic informal risk sharing networks or 
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formal institutions such as religious, government and non-government organizations, the 
detrimental impacts of unexpected health shocks and the risk of catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
care expenditure could be considerable. The typical coping mechanisms against such shocks, as 
in many other low-income rural areas, are to sell productive assets such as oxen, borrow at a high 
interest rate, or completely forgo healthcare all together just because they cannot afford. These 
sub-optimal coping mechanisms themselves entail considerable welfare loss and could push 
them into poverty trap.  
With regards to strategic interactions among networks, networks which have close blood 
ties with the household such as nonresident family members and relatives complement each 
other’s planned component of transfers. Although we find no significant interaction between 
other networks, what is intriguing is that, whatever strategic interaction therein, the magnitude is 
more pronounced on the planned component of transfers as opposed to the unplanned or 
idiosyncratic component which is, particularly, pertinent to transitory/short-term health shocks. 
The implication is that, given complementarities of transfers, should an individual realize short-
term illness, the amount and likelihood of receiving transfers from family members, who 
typically provide assistance regardless of future reciprocity, is low. In essence, when help is most 
needed due to unforeseen short-term illnesses receiving it is difficult, even from close family 
members. This shows that, although households receive some sort of support from close family 
members, it is very limited or does not exist against short-term health shocks, which are common 
in rural places. Furthermore, we find significant negative history dependence in transfers 
suggesting limited commitment among non-altruistic groups. Interestingly, there is also negative 
history dependence in transfers from close family members, relatives, and formal institutions 
suggesting the tendency to discourage dependency as opposed to limited commitment per se.  
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To sum up, the findings highlight that rural households are largely exposed to the risks of 
healthcare shocks and assistance from informal risk sharing networks are rarely available to 
cushion households from the financial, health, and welfare impacts of health shocks. Introducing 
health insurance systems or other third-part healthcare financing mechanisms would increase 
welfare significantly. Recently, Ethiopia started to pilot innovative community based (mutual) 
health insurance schemes in selected rural villages and expected to be gradually rolled out to the 
majority of rural villages. Other countries such as Rwanda have reached coverage of up to 90% 
of the population through community based health insurance schemes. Evidence show significant 
positive impacts on healthcare utilization rates and protecting households from health-related 
financial ruins (Woldemichael and Shimeles, 2015; Woldemichael et al. 2016; Lu et al., 2012; 
Shimeles, 2010).    
Our study is not without caveats. The panel dataset covers periods between 1994 and 
1997, which is over 20 years. The concern is that the findings might not reflect the current 
market, institutional, cultural settings in rural Ethiopia. However, given that much has not 
changed in terms of the country’s health insurance landscape, where formal health insurance 
coverage is below 2%, the results could still be valid. Furthermore, the results show how 
interrelated social network groups behave in response to realized health shocks. Unless there has 
been rapid social, cultural, and religious changes that significantly alter the social network 
behavior, the results should still hold true. Nonetheless, results should be interpreted with these 
caveats in mind.
6. Conclusion 
Although it is evident that informal risk sharing networks provide some sort of insurance against 
income and consumption shocks, little is understood on whether the same holds true for health 
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shocks, especially in the presence of multiple and possibly interacting networks. Using 
household panel data from rural Ethiopia, we provide empirical evidence on whether informal 
risk sharing arrangements provide insurance against short-term and long-term health shocks. We 
acknowledge and explicitly address multiple and possibly strategically interacting networks, 
which could complement or crowd each other out, using correlated random effects dynamic SUR 
Probit and Tobit models. In the model we address various empirical challenges and capture the 
extent of strategic interaction. Furthermore, the empirical model allows us to pin down the 
specific component of transfer that social networks interact.
We find no evidence of informal risk sharing against health shocks among non-altruistic 
individuals in rural Ethiopia. However, transfers from networks related along blood-line (non-
resident family members and relatives) significantly respond to health shocks, particularly to 
long-term disabilities and senior members of society. These findings undoubtedly highlight the 
importance of altruism and social norms in the rural risk sharing network topology. Our study 
also finds that families and relatives constitute network groups which strategically complement 
the planned component (such as regular remittances, entitlements, and chop money) of transfer. 
However, we find no statistically significant strategic interaction on either idiosyncratic or 
planned components of transfers for other social networks constituting friends, neighbors, 
members of informal associations as well as formal institutions.   
The take home message is that health shock remains to be important risk which is not 
well insured in rural Ethiopia where households absorb substantial part of the impacts. Although 
extended family members and relatives provide some assistance in response to health shocks, it 
is insufficient especially against transitory health shocks such as illnesses. Formal interventions 
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such as community-based health insurance schemes could fill such gap in rural Ethiopia. In the 
absence of significant crowding-out between formal institutions and informal risk sharing 
networks, such interventions could be welfare enhancing.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables 
Table A.1: Posterior Estimates of Coefficients of Correlated Random Effects Dynamic SUR  Tobit Model 
Dependent Variable: Log of Transfers; No. of households = 1380, No. of Observations = 4140 

 SenderGroupI  SenderGroupII  SenderGroupIII  SenderGroupIV
 Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev.
Intercept Ͳ32.86* (3.80)  Ͳ21.74* (3.09)  Ͳ9.57* (1.60)  Ͳ10.23* (1.36)
Laggeddepvar1 0.85 (0.84) 0.56 (0.70) 0.65 (0.66) Ͳ0.53 (0.45)
Laggeddepvar2 1.70* (0.67) Ͳ1.07 (0.60) Ͳ0.40 (0.70) Ͳ0.27 (0.28)
Laggeddepvar3 Ͳ88.15* (10.90) 0.83 (0.96) Ͳ6.13* (3.06) 0.19 (0.33)
Laggeddepvar4 0.87 (0.59) 0.71 (0.37) 0.14 (0.25)  Ͳ0.73* (0.14)
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
D#illdays 0.10 (0.11) Ͳ0.02 (0.10) Ͳ0.01 (0.07) Ͳ0.03 (0.04)
D#disabilities 1.24* (0.49) Ͳ0.46 (0.40) Ͳ0.26 (0.35) Ͳ0.01 (0.16)
Dage 0.14* (0.05) 0.12* (0.04) Ͳ0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02)
DlnnonͲfoodcons 0.85 (1.07) 0.54 (0.76) 0.64 (0.48) Ͳ0.29 (0.26)
HHsize 2.81* (0.90) 0.87 (0.52) Ͳ1.53* (0.40) Ͳ0.30 (0.21)
Land Ͳ2.63* (1.28) 0.15 (0.50) 0.73 (0.45) Ͳ0.10 (0.20)
Lnlivestockvalue 0.37 (0.49) 0.37 (0.35) 0.26 (0.27) Ͳ0.02 (0.12)
Mlnlivestockvalue Ͳ1.06 (0.55) Ͳ0.70 (0.45) Ͳ0.70 (0.35) Ͳ0.08 (0.15)
Mhhsize Ͳ2.79* (0.96) Ͳ1.06 (0.57) 1.38* (0.42) 0.47* (0.22)
MdlnnonͲfoodcons Ͳ0.81 (1.39) 1.14 (1.04) Ͳ1.93* (0.78) Ͳ0.22 (0.39)
Initiallntransfer4 1.19 (1.01) 0.72 (0.54) 1.09 (0.84) 0.61* (0.25)
Sex Ͳ1.58 (2.96) Ͳ6.74* (2.01) Ͳ0.12 (1.80) 0.44 (0.83)
Married 2.82 (3.04) 0.99 (1.99) 0.66 (1.86) Ͳ0.43 (0.85)
Primary Ͳ2.40 (1.55) Ͳ1.65 (1.15) Ͳ2.79* (0.99) Ͳ0.11 (0.53)
Junior Ͳ9.92 (10.43) Ͳ5.95 (4.21) Ͳ3.82 (2.36) 0.36 (1.42)
Abovehighschool Ͳ18.35 (13.36) 1.77 (2.72) Ͳ5.82 (2.99) 2.22 (1.49)
vDummies2 0.89 (6.29) Ͳ38.33* (18.63) Ͳ15.88 (11.80) 10.05* (1.27)
vDummies3 3.91 (5.34) Ͳ7.24 (5.67) Ͳ2.80 (4.72) 6.35* (1.25)
vDummies4 5.60 (6.16) Ͳ0.11 (3.93) Ͳ15.27 (11.55) Ͳ16.23* (8.36)
vDummies5 6.68 (4.85) Ͳ5.74 (3.69) 9.17* (2.31) 12.70* (1.26)
vDummies6 12.16* (5.41) Ͳ3.55 (3.61) Ͳ7.09 (7.47) Ͳ5.72* (2.22)
vDummies7 13.11* (6.23) 4.48 (3.89) 10.22* (3.21) 7.26* (1.52)
vDummies8 13.26* (4.93) 8.34 (3.05) 5.28* (2.71) 8.70* (1.35)
vDummies9 13.70* (4.67) 8.20 (3.19) 6.42* (2.62) Ͳ6.75* (2.60)
vDummies10 16.71* (4.88) 11.82 (3.11) 3.87 (3.76) 3.54* (1.41)
vDummies11 11.78* (5.40) 5.88 (3.22) 4.44 (3.43) Ͳ2.32 (1.76)
vDummies12 0.81 (5.81) Ͳ0.57 (3.31) 1.09 (2.69) Ͳ5.47* (2.01)
vDummies13 Ͳ8.00 (22.59) Ͳ2.91 (4.57) 12.83* (2.44) 0.17 (1.41)
vDummies14 Ͳ40.53 (23.29) Ͳ144.03* (24.43) 2.05 (3.06) 6.05* (1.27)
vDummies15 16.05* (4.68)  1.08 (3.32)  Ͳ10.64 (6.22)  Ͳ3.72* (1.86)
Sender groups: I. Non-resident family members, II. Relatives, III. Friends, neighbors, members of Iqqub and Iddir, and IV. 
Church, mosque, NGOs, government organizations 
* Indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant (the coefficient divided by the standard deviation is greater than or equal 
to two). 
Time-means of covariates are shown by prefix M (e.g., Mhh size is the time-mean of household size, Hh size). VDummies 
indicate village dummy variables.  
Other pertinent estimation results from the correlated random effects dynamic Tobit SUR model are shown in tables 7 and 9. In 
particular, the average partial effects based on the coefficient estimates reported in Table C.1 are given in Table 7. 
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Table 1. Variables Description and Summary Statistics 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Min  Max 
Transfers: 
Log of all Transfers 0.878 1.793 0 7.638 
Log of transfers excluding Religious/NGOs/Govt/Other 0.306 1.091 0 6.621 
Log of transfers from Non-resident Family Members 0.054 0.497 0 5.956 
Log of transfers from Other Relatives 0.167 0.842 0 6.621 
Log of transfers from Friends/Neighbor/Iqqub/Iddir 0.094 0.564 0 5.303 
Log of transfers from Religious/NGOs/Govt/Other 0.601 1.559 0 7.638 
Disabilities and Illnesses: 
No. of Household Heads Disability (0/5) 0.731 1.414 0 5 
No. of days Household Head was unable to work due to 
illness 1.998 5.945 0 30 
Demographic Characteristics and Assets: 
Household Size 5.911 2.969 1 25 
Household Head is Male ( 1= male, 0 otherwise) 0.775 0.418 0 1 
Age of Household Head 47.07 15.87 15 100 
Household Head is Married: (1 = married, 0 otherwise) 0.749 0.434 0 1 
Log of Non-food expenditure 3.72 1.283 0 7.818 
Household Head's Education: Primary (1-6 Grade) 0.428 0.495 0 1 
Household Head's education: Junior High (7-8)  0.028 0.166 0 1 
Household Head's education: High school and above 
(>=9) 0.032 0.177 0 1 
Size of land (hectare) 1.338 1.418 0 13.38 
Log of Value of Livestock  5.747 3.045 0 11.25 
No. of observations by survey year: 
Round 1: March - July 1994 1,475
Round 2: Sept. 1994 - Jan. 1995 1,464
Round 3: March - June 1995 1,460
Round 4: June - Nov. 1997  1,404
  Total no. of observations 5,803       
Note: Number of disability is the sum of the following conditions: 1) difficulty to standup from 
seated position, 2) difficulty to sweep a floor, 3) difficulty to walk independently for 5 km, 4) 
difficulty to carry 20 liters for 20 meters, and 5) difficulty to hoe a field in a morning.
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Table 2. Proportion of Transfer Recipients and Conditional Transfers by Rounds 
Transfer type/Round  
Proportions Conditional Log Transfers 
No. of 
Obs. Mean
No. of 
Obs. Mean St. Dev. 
Transfer from Any Sender 5,803 20.66% 1,199 4.248 0.032
Round 1 1,475 8.41% 124 3.969 0.09
Round 2 1,464 34.08% 499 4.738 0.05
Round 3 1,460 14.32% 209 4.037 0.066
Round 4 1,404 26.14% 367 3.797 0.05
Transfer from Sender Group I 5,803 1.24% 72 4.379 0.981
Round 1 1,475 0.88% 13 4.364 0.258
Round 2 1,464 1.43% 21 4.572 0.162
Round 3 1,460 1.03% 15 4.254 0.218
Round 4 1,404 1.64% 23 4.292 0.266
Transfer from Sender Group II 5,803 4.10% 238 4.072 1.181
Round 1 1,475 4.54% 67 3.966 0.128
Round 2 1,464 3.28% 48 4.215 0.17
Round 3 1,460 4.25% 62 4.275 0.148
Round 4 1,404 4.34% 61 3.869 0.168
Transfer from Sender Group III 5,803 2.77% 161 3.376 0.633
Round 1 1,475 0.81% 12 3.463 0.163
Round 2 1,464 2.05% 30 3.308 0.126
Round 3 1,460 1.44% 21 3.651 0.214
Round 4 1,404 6.98% 98 3.327 0.052
Transfer from Sender Group IV 5,803 13.75% 798 4.369 1.103
Round 1 1,475 2.58% 38 3.874 0.153
Round 2 1,464 29.51% 432 4.811 0.052
Round 3 1,460 8.42% 123 3.874 0.069
Round 4 1,404 14.60% 205 3.828 0.064
           Note - Sender groups: I. Non-resident family members, II. Relatives, III. Friends, neighbors, members of    
                     Iqqub and Iddir, and IV. Church, mosque, NGOs, government organizations. 
32

Table 3.  Amount of Annual Conditional Transfers Received (in 
Birr)
(1994 – 1997) 
 Sender type No. of 
Obs. Mean 
Std.
Dev. Min Max 
Any Sender 1,199 477.5 714.8 0.0 8,300.7 
Sender Group I 72 341.0 253.5 24.0 1,155.0 
Sender Group II 238 323.8 405.8 1.9 2,250.0 
Sender Group III 161 140.8 117.7 12.0 800.0 
Sender Group IV 798 561.6 816.2 0.0 8,300.7 
Note: Birr is the local currency in Ethiopia. The exchange rate for 6.32 Birr/USD in 1994 
and 7.06 Birr/USD in 1997/1998 (National Bank of Ethiopia). 
                                 Sender groups: I. Non-resident family members, II. Relatives, III. Friends, neighbors, members of    
                                                          Iqqub and Iddir, and IV. Church, mosque, NGOs, government organizations. 
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Figure 1. Kernel Distribution of Unobserved Individual Heterogeneity 
(a) Dynamic SUR Tobit Model (b) Dynamic SUR Probit Model 


1The survey was conducted in collaboration with Economics Department, Addis Ababa University (AAU), and the 
Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), University of Oxford. The funding for the survey was provided 
by Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank. The data are publicly available at 
various online repositories and web links and detailed description of the survey can be found at 
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/datasets/Ethiopia-ERHS/ERHS-main.html.
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Supplementary Appendix B: Theoretical Framework 
Following the literature (Thomas and Worrall (1988); Kocherlakota (1996); De Weerdt and 
Fafchamps (2011)), we provide the theoretical framework for informal risk sharing under limited 
commitment and derive estimable equation for our empirical analysis.  
Under perfect information regime with full commitment, allocation schemes rely on the 
assumption that contracts are enforceable. However, such arrangement is difficult to implement 
due to lack of commitment and enforcement mechanisms as individuals may decide to deviate at 
any given time or state. Such difficulty in enforcement makes the first-best solution of voluntary 
informal risk sharing arrangement unsustainable (Thomas and Worrall (1988); Kocherlakota 
(1996)). Sustainable informal risk sharing contracts should, therefore, guarantee lifetime utility 
of at least the autarky level to voluntarily keep individuals in the risk sharing contract.  
Consider a closed economy inhabited by two infinitely-lived identical and risk-averse individuals 
݅ ൌ  ሼͳǡʹሽ who maximize lifetime utility. They are identical because they have the same 
preferences and are endowed with the same exogenous random endowment processes. Let ݏ
denote the realized state in period ݐ and ݏ௧denote the history of endowment processes, i.e. ݏ௧ ൌ
ሺݏଵǡ ݏଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݏ௧ሻ. Also, let individual 1 has income ݕଵሺݏ௧ሻ in state ݏ௧ and individual 2 has 
incomeݕଶሺݏ௧ሻ, which are assumed to be independently and identically distributed ሺ݅Ǥ ݅Ǥ ݀Ǥ ሻover
time with probabilityܲݎሺݏ௧ ൌ ݏ௞ሻ ൌ ߨ௞. Aggregate income in all periods and states is assumed 
to be constant (i.e., there is no aggregate uncertainty) and is given byܻ ൌ ݕଵሺݏ௧ሻ ൅ ݕଵሺݏ௧ሻ.
However, the distribution of income among individuals varies over time depending on the 
realization of historyݏ௧. Individual݅’s preference is given by 
ܧ଴෍ߚ௧ܲݎሺݏ௧ሻݑ൫ܿ௜ሺݏ௧ሻ൯
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
ǡ Ͳ ൏ ߚ ൏ ͳǡሺܤͳሻ
where ܿ௜ሺݏ௧ሻ is consumption in period ݐ when history ݏ௧occurs,ܲݎሺݏ௧ሻ is the probability of 
history ݏ௧ occurring, ߚ is private discount rate, and ܧ is the expectation operator. The utility 
function ݑሺήሻ satisfies ݑԢሺήሻ ൐ Ͳ and ݑᇱᇱሺήሻ ൏ Ͳ with݈݅݉ሺ௫՜଴ሻݑԢሺݔሻ ൌ λ. It is established that 
risk-averse individuals are better-off involved in a risk sharing arrangement as long as their 

1Appendix A on additional tables is included in the paper.
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endowments are not positively and perfectly correlated. Given that individuals are endowed with 
riskless asset ܣ௜௧with constant returnݎ, the resource constraint with accumulation is given by 
෍ܿ௜௧ሺݏ௧ሻ
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
൑෍ሾݕ௜ሺݏ௧ሻ ൅ ܣ௜௧ሺݏ௧ሻሿ
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ܺ௧ሺݏ௧ሻǡሺܤʹሻ
where ܺ௧ሺݏ௧ሻ is total cash in hand. In the presence of limited commitment, individuals 
voluntarily participate in risk sharing contracts if and only if their lifetime utility from 
participation is greater than or equal to the autarky level. That is the participation constraint 
given as follows should hold 
෍ߚ௥ିଵ ሺݏ௥ሻݑ൫ܿ௜ሺݏ௥ሻ൯
ஶ
௥ୀଵ
൒ ௜ܸ௔௨௧ሺܣ௜௧ሻǡሺܤ͵ሻ
where ௜ܸ௔௨௧ሺܣ௜௧ሻ is the value of autarkic life time utility. Then, one can solve the stochastic 
dynamic model in equation (B1) and (B2) using either a decentralized game approach or a social 
planner’s approach and arrive at the same solution. We follow the latter approach as it is handy 
to deal with dynamic stochastic game problem. In the social planner’s approach, each 
individual’s problem of solving the optimization problem becomes the planner’s problem. The 
social planner maximizes the utility of both individuals by solving the standard stochastic 
dynamic programming problem given by 
௖೔ ܧ଴෍ߚ
௧
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
෍߱௜ܲݎሺݏ௧ሻݑ൫ܿ௜ሺݏ௧ሻ൯
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
ǡሺܤͶሻ
subject to the resource constraint given in equation (B2) and participation constraints given by 
equation (B3). Here ߱௜ such that σ ߱௜ଶ௜ୀଵ ൌ ͳ is the Pareto weight assigned to individuals݅.
However, due to the participation constraint which depends on future decision values, solving 
the equation (B1) subject to constraints (B2) and (B3) makes the use of standard stochastic 
dynamic optimization such as Lagrangian method difficult. However, the Saddle-Point method 
due to Marcet and Marimon (2011), the optimization problem can be given formulated in a 
relatively easy to solve Bellman equation formulation. After dropping ݏ௧ for the sake of 
simplicity the problem is to optimize  
ܹሺܣ௜௧ǡ ߤ௜௧ሻ ൌ  ఓ೔೟ஹఓ೔೟షభ ሼ௖೔೟ǡ஺೔೟శభሽ೔సభమ ൝෍
ሾሺ߱௜ ൅ ߤ௜௧ାଵሻݑሺܿ௜௧ሻ െ ሺߤ௜௧ାଵ െ ߤ௜௧ሻ ௜ܸ௧௔௨௧ሺܣ௜௧ሻሿ
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߚܧሾܹሺܣ௜௧ାଵǡ ߤ௜௧ାଵሻሿൡǡሺͷሻ
subject to the resource constraint in equation (B2) and the co-state (Lagrangian Multiplier on the 
Participation Constraint) variable ߤ௜௧whose dynamics is recursively defined as
3

ߤ௜௧ାଵ ൌ ߤ௜௧ ൅ ߢ௜௧ǡߤ௜଴ ൌ Ͳǡ׊݅ǡ ݐǤሺ͸ሻ
The co-state variable is just the sum of past multipliers on the participation constraint. It 
increases with the number of times the participation constraint binds, where ߢ௜௧takes a positive 
value when the constraint binds in period ݐ and Ͳ otherwise. In the optimization problem given in 
equation (B5), one can also include individual’s Euler equations as additional constraints to 
guarantee at least the autarkic benefit individuals can get by saving in their assets. However, in 
the social planner’s set-up this constraint become irrelevant at the social planner’s Euler equation 
is always bigger than the individual’s (Abraham and Laczo, 2013). For this reason, we ignore 
individual’s storage constraint.
Solving equations (B5), (B2), and (B6) for infinitely-lived agents ݅ and݆ yields the following 
Euler equation for Pareto optimal allocations with limited commitment  
ݑᇱሺܿ௜௧ሻሺ߱௜ ൅ ߤ௜௧ାଵሻ ൌ ݑᇱ൫ ௝ܿ௧൯൫ ௝߱ ൅ ߤ௝௧ାଵ൯ǡሺܤ͹ሻ
where ݑᇱሺήሻ is the marginal utility. In order to derive estimable equation, assume exponential 
utility function of the formݑሺݔሻ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሺെߩݔሻ, where ݔ is money and  ߩ is risk-aversion 
parameter. Also, suppose that individual ݅ experiences a negative health shock in periodݐ, then 
the condition for optimal allocation implies that ݆ should transfer ௝߬௜௧ to݅. Then substituting the 
corresponding budget constraints ௝ܿ௧ ൌ ݕ௝௧ െ ௝߬௜௧ andܿ௜௧ ൌ ݕ௜௧ ൅ ௝߬௜௧ yields 
 ௝߬௜௧ ൌ ቀ
ݕ௝௧ െ ݕ௜௧
ʹ ቁ ൅
ͳ
ʹߩ  ቆ
߱௜ ൅ ߤ௜௧ାଵ
௝߱ ൅ ߤ௝௧ାଵቇǡሺܤͺሻ
where ௝߬௜௧ is the amount of transfer from individual ݆ to ݅. When altruism and social norms enter 
the model, the resulting Pareto optimal allocation is different. De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2011)
extends the standard model to accommodate altruism by assuming that individual ݆ derives 
subjective utility ( ௝ܸ) from helping individual ݅ and vice-versa which could be a function of how 
close (genetically or socially) they are. Then, when the level of altruism is sufficiently large, the 
promise of future reciprocity becomes irrelevant and altruistic individuals provide assistance 
when households experience shocks.
Supplementary Appendix C: Estimation Algorithm of Bayesian RE Dynamic Correlated 
Tobit SUR Model 
This appendix describes the estimation algorithm, including computation of the average marginal 
effects.  Combining terms in equations 2 through 5, the dynamic correlated RE Tobit SUR model 
can be compactly written as  
࣎௜௧כ ൌ ࣂࢃ௜௧ ൅ ࢛௜ ൅ ࢿ௜௧ǡሺͳሻ
4
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where ࣎௜௧כ ൌ ሾ߬ଵ௜௧כ ǡ ߬ଶ௜௧כ ǡ ߬ଷ௜௧כ ǡ ߬ସ௜௧כ ሿ,ࢃ࢏࢚ ൌ ݀݅ܽ݃ሺ ଵܹ௜௧ǡ ଶܹ௜௧ǡ ଷܹ௜௧ǡ ସܹ௜௧ሻ,ࢃ௠௜௧ ൌ ൣ߬௠௜ǡ௧ିଵǡ
ࢄ௠௜௧ǡ ߬௠௜଴ǡ ࢄ௠௜൧, ࣂ ൌ ሾߛǡ ࢈ǡ ࢼሿԢ, and all other terms are as defined before. Then, the likelihood 
function conditional on the latent variables and the covariates can be expressed as  
݂ሺ࣎௜ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ࣎௜்ȁ࣎௜ଵכ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ்࣎௜כ ǡࢃ௜௧ǡ ሼ࢛௜ሽǡ ࣂǡ ࢹǡ ࢳሻ
ൌෑ൜ͳሺ࣎௜௧ ൐ ૙ሻ૚ሺ࣎௜௧ ൌ ࣎௜௧כ ሻ ൅ ૚ሺ࣎௜௧ ൌ ૙ሻͳሺ࣎௜௧כ ൏ ૙ሻ
்
௧ୀଵ
ൈ ൬ሺʹߨሻெଶ ȁࢹȁଵଶ ݁ݔ݌ ൜െͳʹ ሺ࣎࢏࢚
כ െ ࣂࢃ௜௧ െ ࢛࢏ሻԢࢹିଵሺ࣎࢏࢚כ െ ࣂࢃ࢏࢚ െ ࢛࢏ሻൠ൰ൠǤሺܥʹሻ
The joint posteriors of all parameters of RE dynamic correlated SUR Tobit model is given by 
݌ሺሼ࣎௜௧כ ሽǡ ሼ࢛௜ሽǡ ࢛ǡ ીǡ ષǡ ઱ȁ࣎௜ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ࣎௜்ǡࢃ௜௧ሻ
ןෑෑ݂ሺ࣎௜ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ࣎௜்ȁ࣎௜ଵכ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ࣎௜்כ ǡࢃ௜௧ǡ ሼ࢛௜ሽǡ ીǡ ષǡ ઱ሻ
்
௧ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
ൈ ݌ሺሼ࣎௜௧כ ሽȁሼ࢛௜ሽǡ ࢛ǡ ીǡ ષǡ ઱ǡ ࣎௜ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ࣎௜்ǡࢃ௜௧ሻ
ൈ ݌ሺሼ࢛௜ሽȁ࢛ǡ ીǡ ષǡ ઱ǡࢃ௜௧ሻ ൈ ݌ሺ࢛ሻ ൈ ݌ሺીሻ 
ൈ ݌ሺષǡ ઱ሻǡሺܥ͵ሻ
where ݌ሺήሻ are probability distributions. We assign flat (non-informative) priors on all model 
parameters. The MCMC estimation algorithm for the RE dynamic correlated SUR Tobit model is 
as follows: 
1. For each equation ݉ conditional on ߬௠௜଴,ࢃ௠௜௧, ࢛௜, ݑ, ીǡષǡ ઱ and the latent variables 
߬ି୫୧୲כ , draw ߬୫୧୲כ  from a truncated normal distribution with mean ࣆ௠௜௧ࢉ ൌ ીࢃ௠௜௧ ൅ ࢛௠௜ ൅
ષ௠ષ௠௠ି૚ ሺ߬ି୫୧୲כ െ ࣂି௠ ିܹ௠௜௧ െ ݑି௠௜ሻand standard deviation ߪ௠௖ଶ ൌ ષ௠௠ െ
ષ௠௝ષ௠௠ି૚ ષ௠௝ᇱ  if ߬௠௜୲ ൌ Ͳǡ otherwise set ߬୫୧୲כ ൌ ߬௠௜୲.
2. Conditional on࣎௜௧כ ,ࢃ௜௧ǡ ࢛௜ǡ ࢛, ીǡ ઱ draw ષ from inverse Wishart distribution ݅ݓሺݒષǡ ࡿષሻ
with parameters ݒஐ ൌ ݒஐబ ൅ ܰܶand ܵஐ ൌ ܵஐబ ൅ σ σ ሺ࣎௜௧כ െ ીࢃ௜௧ െ௧்ୀଵே௜ୀଵ
࢛௜ሻሺ࣎௜௧כ െ ીࢃ௜௧ െ ࢛࢏ሻᇱ.
3. Conditional onܑ࣎ܜכ ,ࢃ௜௧ǡ ࢛ǡ ીǡ ઱, ષ draw ࢛௜for each individual from multivariate normal 
distribution݉ݒ݊ሺࣆ௨୧ǡ ࢂ௨௜ሻwith meanࣆ௨௜ ൌ ࢂ௨௜൫઱ିଵ࢛ ൅ ષିଵࢃ௜ᇱሺ࣎௜כ െ ીࢃ௜ሻ൯ and 
variance ࢂ௨௜ ൌ ሺ઱ିଵ ൅ ષିଵ࢒ᇱ் ࢒்ሻିଵ.
4. Conditional on ࢛௜and ઱ draw ࢛ from a multivariate normal distribution ݉ݒ݊ሺࣆ௨ǡ ࢂ௨ሻ
with mean ࣆ௨ ൌ ࢂ௨൫ࢂ௨૙ିଵࣆ௨૙ ൅ ઱ିଵ σ ࢛௜ே௜ୀଵ ൯ and varianceࢂ௨ ൌ ൫ࢂ௨૙ିଵ ൅ ࡺࡹ઱ିଵ൯
ିଵ
.
5. Conditional on ݑ௜and ݑ draw ȭ from inverse Wishart distribution ݅ݓሺݒஊǡ ܵஊሻ with 
parametersݒஊ ൌ ݒஊబ ൅ ܰandࡿ઱ ൌ ࡿ઱૙ ൅ σ ሺ࢛௜ െ ࢛ሻሺ࢛௜ െ ࢛ሻԢே௜ୀଵ .
5

6. Conditional on࣎௜௧כ ǡ ࢃ௜௧ǡ ࢛௜ǡ ષǡ drawી from multivariate normal distribution 
݉ݒ݊ሺࣆࣂǡ ࢂࣂሻ  with mean ࣆࣂ ൌ ࢂࣂ൫ࢂࣂ૙ିଵࣆࣂ૙ ൅ σ σ ࢃ௜௧ષିଵሺ࣎௜௧כ െ ࢛௜ሻ௧்ୀଵே௜ୀଵ ൯  and ࢂࣂ ൌ
൫ࢂࣂ૙ିଵ ൅ σ σ ࢃԢ௜௧ષିଵࢃ௜௧௧்ୀଵே௜ୀଵ ൯.
The algorithm cycles through steps 1-6 until convergence. We wrote the estimation code in 
Matlab and tested on simulated data before we apply it to the real data. We conduct 10,000 
MCMC simulations with the first 5,000 draws dropped as burn-ins. We assess convergence of 
the MCMC draws using trace plots as well as formal convergence diagnostic test developed by 
Geweke (1992).
In order to assess the effect of covariates on transfers, we calculate the Average Partial Effects 
(APEs). The advantage of the Bayesian method is that APEs can be easily obtained as a 
byproduct of the MCMC simulations. The predicted values with covariates are given by 
ܧሺ߬௠௜௧ȁ߬ି௠௜௧ǡ ࢻǡ ࢼǡࢃǡࢹǡ ࢳሻ ൌ ߔ ቆ
ߤ௠௜௧௖
ߪ௠௖ଶ ቇ ߤ௠௜௧ ൅ ߪ௠
௖ଶ߶ ቆߤ௠௜௧
௖
ߪ௠௖ଶ ቇǡ
whereߤ௠௜௧௖ ൌ ݑ௠௜ ൅ ࢼ௠ࢃ௠௜௧ ൅ ષ௠௝ષ௠௠ିଵ ሺ߬ି୫୧୲כ െ ݑି௠௜ െ ࢼି௠ࢃି௠௜௧ሻis the conditional 
mean, ߪ௠௖ଶ ൌ ȳ௠௠ െ ȳ௠௝ȳ௠௠ିଵ ȳԢ௠௝ is the conditional variance. Then, the APEs for the ݇௧௛
continuous variables is given by
߲ܧሺ߬௠௜௧ȁ߬ି௠௜௧ǡ ࢻǡ ࢼǡࢃǡࢹǡ ࢳሻ߲ݔ௜௧௞
ൌ ߔ ቆߤ௠௜௧
௖
ߪ௠௖ଶ ቇߚ
௞ǡ
where ߚ௞ ൌ ߚ௠௞ െ ȳ௠௝ȳ௠௠ିଵ ߚି௠௞ . Similarly, the APE for a dummy variable is given by the 
difference between the values of ܧሺ߬௠௜௧ȁ߬ି௠௜௧ǡ ࢻǡ ࢼǡࢃǡࢹǡ ࢳሻ when ௠ܹ௜௧௞ ൌ ͳand when ௠ܹ௜௧௞ ൌ
Ͳ, respectively.
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